The response of national, state-level political parties to the challenges of competing for power at the devolved, regional levels is a neglected research topic. This article seeks to remedy this neglect by analyzing how the British Labour Party has responded to these challenges at the subnational level following UK devolution. British Labour remains formally a unitary party despite governmental devolution. Nonetheless, the national party leadership has allowed the Scottish and Welsh Parties considerable freedom, in practice, to select candidates, conduct regional-level elections and implement some distinctive policies. Meanwhile, the Scottish and Welsh Labour Parties have shifted significantly from being traditional, centralized parties with a single hierarchical organization towards more pluralist, less hierarchical organizations.
Introduction 1
The dominant trend in the major developed countries has been towards the nationalization of politics (Caramani 2004) . The literature on the political parties has focussed on national, state-level politics: how national parties campaign, win votes and organize themselves at the national level, while the territorial dimension has been largely neglected. The advent of regional-nationalist movements and parties, and governments' responses to these new movements by devolving powers, has redirected interest towards the territorial dimension.
Yet the response of national-level political parties to the new challenges posed by devolved government, not least from the regional-nationalist parties, has been neglected. This article seeks to remedy this neglect by examining how the British Labour Party -usually identified c:\documents and settings\pr7\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\o9e381m3\the new subnational politics of the lp final [1] .doc powers assigned to territorially-based party units. For example, the previously centralized German Social Democratic Party (SPD) gradually moved to a more stratified authority structure to enable it to organize and compete more effectively at lander level. The lander party organizations have assumed key roles in the vital candidate selection and policymaking functions, thereby dispersing power within the SPD along more federal lines (Gabriel, 1989: 69; Jeffrey, 1999) . This article is about how British Labour has adapted to devolution and the focus is on the newly significant Scottish and Welsh Labour parties (we have elsewhere explored the national-level Labour response, Laffin, Shaw and Taylor, 2004) . The rationale is that the dynamics of the regional branches of the national parties are crucial in understanding the evolution of centre-periphery tensions. Yet how the regional branches of national parties cope with the challenge posed by regional-nationalist parties remains largely unresearched (but see Downs,1998) .
This article investigates the question of whether Labour remains a centralised party or is now characterised by a substantial degree of territorial autonomy. Following Janda's definition of power as about 'the location and distribution of effective decision-making authority within the party', we define a centralised party as 'one which features the concentration of effective decision-making authority in the national party organs' (Janda, 1980:108) . Conversely a party organisation is decentralised insofar as 'units and sub-units possess the ability to take decisions for themselves which are reserved to a higher level in comparable organisations' (Brooke, 1984: 9) . Four basic variables have been commonly adduced as indicators of the intra-party power distribution: candidate recruitment, leadership selection, formulation of policy, controls over finance and administration (Janda, 1980: 109) . For each of these four variables three categories or complex of traits correspond to what we call centralised, intermediate and decentralised organisational patterns. We then survey the evidence to locate c:\documents and settings\pr7\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\o9e381m3\the new subnational politics of the lp final [1] .doc the (territorial) balance of power within the Labour Party along these four dimensions.
Firstly, we indicate the significance of the four variables and define the three categories.
Candidate recruitment
i. Decentralised. The regional party has full authority to determine the procedures for nominating and selecting candidates.
ii. Intermediate. The regional party has delegated authority to determine the procedures for nominating and selecting candidates in conjunction with the national party subject to national organization approval. Informal mechanisms exist by which the national party can exercise influence.
iii. Centralised. The national party controls the regional selection processes.
The literature on territorial relationships within national political parties stresses the importance of control over candidate selection. Gallagher and Marsh (1988: 9) argue that parties in centralised unitary states tend to have centralised procedures for selecting candidates, whilst in federal (or decentralised) countries the key sub-national tier will have a greater role. Similarly, Hopkin (2003) hypothesizes that control of the selection process will emerge as the main fulcrum for centre-periphery conflict. In contrast, Scarrow, Webb and Farrell (2000: 135) posit that ideological differences will form the main cleavage irrespective of the territorial shape of a party.
Leadership Selection
i. Decentralised. The regional party has full authority to determine the procedures for selecting the leader and exercises full control over the process. ii. Intermediate. The regional party has the authority to determine the procedures for selecting the leader but subject to national party approval which also possesses means to influence the outcome.
iii. Centralised. The national party effectively controls the selection process.
The leadership function is a crucial as the methods used to select a leader proffer an insight into the configuration of power in a party. They act as an indicator of power and democracy in post-devolution Labour: 'What would be the point of devolution if our political leaders were still chosen in London after all?' (Lynch and Birrell, 2004: 184) . Has the national leadership the capacity to confine choice to 'safe' and 'responsible' candidates? Or are regional parties the masters of their own fortune?
Formulating Policy
i. Decentralised. Regional party bodies have the right to determine policy on matters within the regional jurisdiction and to formulate policy on other matters to submit to national policy institutions.
ii. Intermediate. Regional party bodies have the right to determine policy within their jurisdiction but the national leadership has -even if no formal authority -in practice considerable influence over what is decided. Regional party bodies do not have the unfettered right to formulate policy on matters outside the jurisdiction of the region.
iii. Centralised. Regional party bodies have some right to determine policy on devolved policy issues but only within a nationally determined framework and subject to the approval of the central leadership.
c:\documents and settings\pr7\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\o9e381m3\the new subnational politics of the lp final [1] .doc This variable measures the extent to which regional-level party parties enjoy the discretion to determine their own policies. Do they have an effective decision-making role or are they just implementing national policy (as, for example, the regional parties of Dutch national political parties do, Deschouwer, 2002: 173) ? Mitchell and Seyd (1998: 109) hypothesised that devolution would 'produce centrifugal pressures within the Westminster parties, and ...more differentiation of policy within the parties in response to the particular needs of the regions. … Distinct policy agenda will be followed…'. Have these centrifugal pressures iii. Centralised. Funds are collected primarily by the national organization, which also exercises responsibility for allocating funds and controls the party apparatus.
The levels at which the collection and distribution of funds occur are important in establishing the intra-party power distribution (Janda, 1980: 111) . If an organisation depends upon centrally-distributed funds, its capacity to set its own priorities is at least potentially compromised. To what extent are the Welsh and Scottish Labour parties financially and administratively self-sufficient?
Establishing the balance of territorial power in the Labour Party at this point in time affords only a static picture. We need, in addition, to explore the underlying forces influencing power patterns. To elucidate these forces we briefly sketch two rival hypotheses. Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' would predict strenuous and ultimately irresistible efforts to assert central control. The development of an elaborate and complex machine for electoral mobilisation , the multiplication of tasks and responsibilities that only experienced and appropriatelyqualified leaders discharge, the need for discipline and obedience all guarantee that, whatever the resistance, a highly centralised system of control will emerge (Michels, 1962) . Thus, even if governmental power is devolved, the imperatives of organisational and electoral efficiency will ensure that power will be monopolised by a small, cohesive elite. coalitions of a range of ideological, social and geographic interests whose rival demands need to be managed. To manage these interests, parties develop a 'stratarchical' pattern of power to sustain unity, enhance electoral appeal and maximise adaptability to local circumstances, 'the party develops its own hierarchical pattern of stratified devolution of responsibility for the settlement of conflicts, rather than jeopardise the viability of the total organization by carrying such conflicts to the top command levels of the party' (Eldersveld, 1964: 9) . Thus he asserts a 'logic of territorial party competition' in which party systems represent a major variable affecting the distribution of power within parties operating in multi-level governmental systems. This logic suggests that the greater the disparities between types of party competition at different territorial levels -and (hence) the wider the range of strategic and political needs of different territorial units within a party -the greater the pressure for territorial decentralisation
The next section applies our typology, examining the four dimensions of (spatially defined) intra-organisational power: candidate recruitment; leadership selection; policy formulation and control over finance and administration.
Candidate Recruitment
Two contrasting generalizations were identified earlier: Hopkins ' (2002) contention that the selection process will be dominated by central-periphery relations and Scarrow et al. (2000) that national leaders prefer legislators of 'a similar ideological profile to themselves' (135).
Such leaders also 'will retain (or assume) a veto over local membership candidate-selection decisions' to prevent 'local selection procedures occasionally [producing] The crucial selection round was in the 1999 election when all seats were up for grabs.
Scottish and Welsh Labour adopted closed candidate lists from which constituency parties (CLPs) could select. Officially the objectives were to raise candidate calibre -partly by discouraging the adoption of established local government notables whose longevity in office was not seen as always 'matched by their talents' -and to improve the prospects of selection for women candidates (Bradbury et al., 2000: 161; Shaw, 2001: 38) . the precise balance between central and regional involvement is immaterial since both shared the same broad aims. Much also depended upon the extent to which applicants had the ear of party influentials and their standing in the party (Shaw, 2001) . Critics, however, claimed that c:\documents and settings\pr7\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\o9e381m3\the new subnational politics of the lp final [1] .doc this was effectively a system of political screening to exclude political 'undesirables'. Indeed, of the 326 interviewed, final approval was given to just 167 possible candidates (of whom 69 were women) -a small number given the129 places to be filled. And, despite having over twice the number of seats to contest and nearly 100 more applicants, Scotland had only 3 more on its panel than did Welsh Labour (Table 1) . Thus Scottish CLPs were left to chose from a pool of 1.3 candidates per seat, while Welsh CLPs had nearly 3 approved candidates for every seat.
-INSERT TABLE 1 HEREIn Wales controversy focused on 'twinning', an attempt to ensure equal selection of women and men candidates in constituency seats by pairing CLPs together, requiring that members of paired CLPs should select one man and one woman. Many long-serving constituency activists questioned this challenge to 'constituency sovereignty' (Laffin, Taylor and Thomas, 2004: 59) . To prevent a repetition of such controversy in the 2003 selection process, the Welsh party adopted the 'affirmative nomination' procedure, first used in the 2001 General Election as a means to reduce the number of seats likely to be contested (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002: 187) . Thus sitting AMs had to be approved by at least half of their CLP membership or face reselection, although no AM ended up facing reselection. The party then had 16 vacancies, 3 resulting from retirements and 13 which Labour had failed to win in 1999. Of these the Party required 6 constituencies to 'volunteer' for all-women shortlists to maintain Labour women AM numbers. Consequently, following the 2003 Assembly election, the Labour Group had a majority of women and the Welsh Assembly became the first elected assembly in the world to have equal numbers of men and women. In Wales centre-periphery tensions were less important than the tensions over twinning and the exclusion of 'old guard' c:\documents and settings\pr7\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\o9e381m3\the new subnational politics of the lp final [1] .doc Labour councillors from the candidates' panel, an intergenerational not ideological tension (Laffin, Taylor and Thomas, 2004) .
In both Scotland and Wales, the unions played a major role -a factor neglected by those who focus on the centre-periphery dimension. Both the affiliated trade unions are deeply embedded in the party fabric and party officials have traditionally worked closely with them in seeking to steer selection outcomes. As one former party official reflected, the party-union relationship 'was a close, continuing and long-term one in which people had invested effort and which operated according to the norms of compromise, mutual accommodation, mutual support and give and take in which both sides avoided pressing demands which the other would find offensive'(interview). If the unions had a strongly favoured candidate, party leaders might hesitate to press the claims of one of their own chosen. The process was thus characterised by both bargaining and muscle-flexing as well as by the application of the rules.
Thus agents of the centre did have some influence over final outcomes but, crucially, working in conjunction with regional elites. The national party neither sought nor was able to control the process. Hence it seems reasonable to classify it as intermediate -the Scottish and Welsh parties had delegated powers to set the ground-rules under the ultimate authority of the NEC.
Where conflicts occurred (as, most notably, in Scotland) they followed a horizontal, ideological (and other) cleavages within the territorial parties and not a centre-periphery cleavage.
Leadership Selection
A party's leader is its public face, personifying the party, as well as the major wielder of These events seem to substantiate Eldersveld's contention that centralised control is dysfunctional, exacerbating rather than abating conflict. After the humiliations suffered by Blair over Morgan (and, even more, Ken Livingstone in London) and unfavourable publicity over 'control freakery', the leadership opted for a more flexible approach to party management, at least along its territorial dimension. The Rhodri Morgan incident may well be regarded as a display of aggressive central intrusion very early in the devolution process, but which is unlikely to recur. If so, and if judgement was made mainly on the Scottish experience, we would be inclined to conclude, on the basis of our research (and other findings), that the leadership selection system conforms more closely to the decentralised than to the intermediate mode. The ability to 'mobilise bias', and thereby shape policy outputs, is (as the neo-elitist school claims) a function of actors' ability to shape rules and manage the decision-making process (Schnattschneider 1960) . From this perspective, however formally democratic a decisionmaking system may appear, a elite with the capacity to structure its rules and procedures will ensure that its voice will prevail on key issues. To what extent do the Scottish and Welsh Policy Forums conform to this 'neo-elitist' model? Scottish and Welsh ministers enjoy an authority, prestige and resources greater than any other stakeholders, not least they can tap their departments' knowledge and expertise. They are strategically placed to act as 'gatekeepers' able to filter demands and secure policies that they deem to be 'deliverable, affordable and within the remit of a devolved administration' (interview, MSP).
The one exception is the affiliated trade unions, traditionally more embedded in the party in Scotland and Wales than in much of England. Indeed the only major clash in the Scottish party was over an issue which set unions against the party leadership -the Private Finance Initiative (the two other major differences did not surface within the Policy Forum: free personal care for the elderly, because of timing, and the long-running sore of the pledgeinsisted upon by the Liberal Democrats -to extend PR to local elections). PFI is a means of funding public infrastructure projects whereby a public authority contracts to purchase services from a private sector consortium of construction companies, bankers and service providers. The Scottish Executive has followed London in relying increasingly on PFI for its capital investment projects in schools, hospitals and prisons. The public sector unions argue that PFI-constructed facilities are expensive and involve serious deterioration in pay and conditions. Led by Unison, they submitted numerous amendments at the relevant policy commissions. Some concessions were made but not enough to avert a major clash at the 2002 Scottish Labour Party Conference when union hostility to PFI meant that Policy Forum c:\documents and settings\pr7\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\o9e381m3\the new subnational politics of the lp final[1].doc policy documents were only narrowly approved (interviews with party and trade union officials). Soon after, the Executive did agree that the employees transferred to the private sector via PFI agreements should maintain their conditions of service. Yet tensions remain as the unions in Scotland, no less than in England, have been unable to derail the PFI juggernaut. They complained of the absence of procedures which would have enabled them to amend policy documents rather than being left with the unpalatable choice of accepting or rejecting them in toto. Party officials claim that the unions had plentiful opportunities to press their views whilst the union counter that the leadership was determined (as nationally) to railroad PFI through (interviews with party and union officials).
What of the role of the Forums in shaping the party manifestoes? In Scotland the Manifesto Development Team (comprising Executive ministers appointed by the First Minister, senior
Scottish Policy Forum members and the Scottish Labour Chair) determined which policies should be included in the manifesto. The preparatory work has been mostly carried out by smaller groups chosen by the First Minister. Thus the manifesto very much bore their signature with only relatively minor concessions attributable to rank-and-file pressure (interviews, party and union officials). Other commentators have arrived at a similar conclusion of ministerial dominance (Clark, 2002: 5; Hassan, 2002: 148) . Similarly, in Wales the JPF had responsibility for drawing up the manifesto but, in practice, ministers dominated the manifesto drafting process (Laffin, Taylor and Thomas, 2004) . policy tack. For the most part, the Westminster government has accepted and even accommodated these decisions in its legislation (Laffin et al., 2005 ).
Tentatively we can reach two conclusions. Firstly, the Westminster Government has adopted a permissive attitude to policies pursued in Scotland and Wales as long as they threaten no major political embarrassment (as free personal care to the elderly did) to the national party.
Secondly, the broadly similar ideological outlook of the three administrations means that very few (if any) serious disagreement over major issues of principle have occurred so the actual balance of power has not yet been really tested. Thirdly, the norms of cohesion and loyalty coupled with electoral considerations and a desire to make devolution work to inhibit the expression of open conflict.
Our (provisional) conclusion is that, so far, policy power relations on the vertical level accord most closely to the intermediate category. On the horizontal, within the two parties, we would place them closer to the elite-driven than the pluralist. This suggests an emergent pattern, in the policy sphere, of territorial cleavages being contained by a high level of interelite collaboration grounded in a broad ideological consensus and a shared conception of the appropriate role of national and sub-national government. We might even hazard the thought that the real cleavage is between the majority of unions and constituencies, on the one hand, and the parliamentary establishment in the three administrations, on the other. 
Control over Finance and Administration
In the early 1960's Magnus Magnusson could refer to Labour in Scotland as 'just a branch office' of the British Labour Party (Wood, 1989: 102) . The party's administrative apparatus in both Scotland and Wales was under the direction of the centre and senior officials were appointed by the NEC, though with some input from the Scottish and Welsh ECs. Whilst the Scottish and Welsh party general secretaries often acted as intermediaries between the regional and national levels of organizations, they were ultimately national party officials acting as political managers 'fixing conference votes and arm-twisting over difficult questions such as the Clause IV vote at Scottish conference in 1995 and the devolution referendum decision in 1996' (Lynch, 1996: 17) .
Since devolution the Scottish and Welsh executives have had more input in the appointment of their secretaries and the two secretaries (and not London) appoint other officials. Despite delegating considerable powers over rule-making and adjudication to the SEC and WEC, the NEC does retains final authority. Where any dispute over 'the meaning, interpretation and general application of the constitution, standing order and rules' occurs the decision of the NEC -subject to modification by Conference -is final (Labour Party Rules, Clause X (5)). 
Conclusion
In seeking to identify the forces shaping the balance of territorial power in the Labour party, we applied a three-fold classification between centralised, intermediate and decentralised to the four dimensions of power -candidate recruitment, leadership selection, policy formation, and funding and administration. The picture that emerges is a complex one which we present in tabulated form.
-INSERT TABLE 2 HEREThis pattern substantiates fully neither the oligarchy or stratarchy hypotheses. Thus our findings do not support two major assumptions in the literature: that the national party necessarily seeks power over the regional parties (as Downs, 1998 assumes) and that the c:\documents and settings\pr7\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\o9e381m3\the new subnational politics of the lp final [1] .doc centre-periphery will overshadow other cleavages. Candidate selection did prove to be a contentious issue but reflected a mix of ideological, inter-generational and other issues within the two parties rather than central-periphery tensions, supporting Scarrow et al. (2000) rather than Hopkin (2003) . Our research does not support Downs' conclusion that national elites made 'conscious attempts to communicate instructions and influence strategy in the subnational institutions to which their respective parties gain entry' (Downs, 1998: 269) . The NEC does retain final authority over the range of functions but, in practice, it has allowed the Scottish and Welsh party executives considerable autonomy. In particular, candidate selection outcomes reflected ideological rather than centre-periphery cleavages. Despite the controversy over Number Ten 'control freakery', there is no evidence to support an 'iron law of oligarchy' thesis if that means the supremacy of a cohesive, tightly-structured and allpowerful elite.
What of the stratarchy thesis? This anticipated that the greater the disparities between the structure of party competition at different territorial levels, the greater the pressure for territorial decentralisation. Strategic autonomy and flexibility for sub-national party elites is more likely to be conducive to the cohesion and electoral effectiveness of the party as a whole than tight central control. A corollary of this hypothesis is that the stronger the challenge from regionalist or nationalist parties, the greater the pressure upon a party to develop internal arrangements that facilitate autonomy and the acquisition of a distinctive regional profile. As Hopkin argues, party leaderships have a strong incentive to bolster the electoral appeal of their regional branches, including by 'allowing regional party organisations to adopt differentiated party programmes, discourses and campaigning strategies in an attempt to develop an ethno-regionalist "face"' (Hopkin, 2003: 232 However, our findings do not unequivocally support the stratarchy thesis -that elite control is dysfunctional and that parties, in response to electoral and organisational challenges, will develop multi-polar systems of power with a plurality of more or less autonomous elites.
This could plausibly be said to apply to leadership selection. In the areas of candidate selection and policy formation the picture is mixed. Most telling of all is the retention by the national party of control over the party organisation and the reliance of the two regional parties upon the centre for adequate funding. Secondly, any possible resurgence of the left, which might lead to it gaining control over key political institutions in the devolved areas, would be major concern for the national leadership and that might prompt their intervention in Scottish and Welsh Labour. One former very senior Holyrood minister told us that whilst Downing Street was prepared to allow 'a bit of slack' it was very reluctant 'for it to be unduly stretched' (interview).
The stratarchy thesis anticipated a Labour party pushed by divergent competitive pressure into a more 'autonomist' direction (Hopkin, 2002 ) that has not so far materialised. In part, because of Labour's success (so far) in containing the nationalist threat and in part because
Labour party cohesion (a desire to avoid destabilising initiatives within the party) cuts across territorial interests. The Scottish and Welsh parties have developed their own policy processes (within a nationally-determined structure) and do enjoy considerable freedom through specific delegations and, in practice, to select candidates and conduct regional-level In short there is a balance between centrifugal and centripetal impulses. Is it stable? We suggest, probably not. The potential exists for the two parties to adopt a more left-inclined political trajectory than in England partly because the gravitational pull of party competition is much more to the left, partly because the more proportional electoral system values all votes more or less equally rather than privileging the floater in the marginal constituency and partly because both share a more deeply rooted social democratic tradition and interests than England. 4 The key factor precipitating change is the appearance of a threat sufficiently serious to jolt the party into new ways of thinking and organising. Thus centre-periphery dynamics would switch onto a different track if Labour were to be in government in Cardiff and Edinburgh -with all the advantages that access to governmental resources and prestige affords -but in opposition in London. Equally, if Labour were to be thrown out of office . 4 In Scotland and Wales the balance of political forces tilts significantly more to the left than in England, reflecting the electoral frailty of the Conservative party and rising competition from the left (especially in Scotland -in the 2003 elections the total Green and Scottish Socialist Party representation rose from two to 13). Already the combination of coalition government plus different electoral and party systems confronts Scottish and Welsh Labour with strategic choices quite distinct from those facing the party nationally and they require freedom to manoeuvre to respond effectively.
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